This article, which examines Türkiye’s approach to Ukraine and China, is part of an ongoing series on U.S. statecraft and the Global South developed by the Carnegie Endowment’s American Statecraft Program. For other articles in the series, click here.
In September 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mooted the possibility that Türkiye might join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a defense bloc led by China.1 A few days later, he flew to New York City and delivered a speech to the UN General Assembly arguing that Türkiye is a core part of NATO and Euro-Atlantic security.2 To Ankara, those two facets of its foreign policy—its status as a NATO ally and its engagement with organizations that challenge the West—are not contradictory. They are part and parcel of the country’s “360-degree foreign policy,” an approach that prioritizes flexibility and strategic independence, with the aim of regenerating Türkiye’s historical role as a major world power. 3 This was no doubt among the calculations that led Ankara to distinguish itself from the West in its harsh criticism of Israel’s retaliatory actions in Gaza in 2023.
Türkiye’s Approach to the War in Ukraine
Unlike many emerging powers, the war in Ukraine directly affects Türkiye, which is not only a NATO member but also geographically situated close to the fighting.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Türkiye suffered as Russia slowly but surely annexed parts of its empire in southeastern Europe and around the Black Sea to the Caucasus. Today, Türkiye’s geography gives it a strong incentive to want to see Moscow deterred from such future land grabs and creates a competition for influence between Türkiye and Russia over countries like Georgia, Azerbaijan, and even those in Central Asia.
But geography also links Türkiye’s economic and energy dependencies on Russia, which make Ankara wary of Russian reprisals. Russia sends Türkiye millions of…
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